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Abstract. During 2006‐2017, Latvia has applied a rather generous accelerated depreciation (AD) policy to stimulate 
firm investment. The AD policy included: (1) the general AD scheme, (2) incentives to acquire new technological 
equipment, and (3) Investment incentives in the specially assisted areas. This paper analyses the effect of accelerated 
depreciation policy on firm investment using administrative firm‐level data for 2007–14. Lacking data for a natural 
experiment (AD began before our sample period), we use difference‐in-differences methodology with identification 
based on variation either across time (the crisis period serving as quasi‐counterfactual) or by firm size (with large 
firms unlikely to be genuinely affected by the policy). We find that past use of AD had a positive effect on firm 
investment rates. The effect is stronger in industries with most of their assets in long-duration categories and among 
enterprises with fewer than six employees. AD of new equipment has a significant effect both on next year investment 
rate and on probability to invest next year, but only for firms with six to ten workers.  
Keywords: tax incentives, corporate investment, accelerated depreciation. 
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Introduction 
During 2006-2017, Latvia has applied a rather generous accelerated depreciation (hereafter AD) policy to stimulate 
firm investment. Neighbouring Estonia has applied, since 2000, a zero corporate income tax on reinvested profit 
(Masso and Meriküll, 2011; Masso et al., 2011). During 2008-2015, business investment rate (defined as gross 
investment divided by gross value added of non-financial corporations) in Latvia was in line with other Baltic 
countries and Poland. However, since 2010, Latvia lags behind Estonia in terms of investment per person employed, 
and the gap is increasing (see Annex 1 for details). Moreover, in Latvia economic activities with high investment per 
person employed and high business investment rate are not among those with the highest apparent labour productivity. 
This might indicate that the AD scheme in Latvia was too general and/or too generous, resulting in over-investment 
in less productive firms or industries. 
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on responses to the following questions: 
• Did the AD policy encourage firms to invest in Latvia? Was the policy well targeted? 
• How did experience in using AD (in terms of relative and absolute size of accelerated depreciation value and the 
magnitude of the reduction of taxable income) affect the size of investment? 
• Was the effect of AD of new equipment stronger than that of other types of AD? 
Previous studies have identified several channels through which accelerated depreciation (AD) might affect 
investments. First, it lowers the user cost of capital (Jorgenson, 1963; Zwick and Mahon, 2017). Second, for firms on 
a tight margin it relaxes the cash flow constraint (Kaplan and Zingales, 1997; Stein, 2003, Devereux and Liu, 2017; 
Zwick and Mahon, 2017, among others). Third, managers keen on tax saving might use AD for this reason but only 
when the tax benefits are immediate (Zwick and Mahon, 2017), as is often the case under the Latvian AD policy.  
Literature Review 
So far, only a few studies have investigated the effect of tax incentives and different types of depreciation, 
especially on business investment across sub-groups of firms. 
Bronzini et al. (2008) evaluated the impact of the investment tax credit on business investment in Italy. They focus 
on the tax credit, which is not restricted to profitable enterprises with tax liability but can also be deducted from any 
outstanding payment due to central government. The amount of tax credit differs by area of eligibility, and the amount 
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of the deduction decreases as local development grows. The results suggest that the program has been effective in 
boosting investment. 
Devereux, Maffini, and Xing (2016) provide evidence of a substantial positive effect of higher depreciation 
allowances on firm investments. In the UK, firms that qualify as an SME can claim a higher first-year capital allowance 
than the larger firms if they were below two of three thresholds for turnover, total assets, and number of employees. 
In 2004, the UK more than doubled the turnover and total assets thresholds. The authors found that access to more 
generous capital allowances increases firm investment by 2.1–2.6 percentage points (pp) relative to firms that never 
qualified for the more generous treatment; at the mean, this is equivalent to an 11 percent increase in investment. 
Yagan (2015) studied the effect of the 2003 US dividend tax cut on corporate investment and labour earnings. In 
his estimation, the tax cut caused zero change in corporate investment and employee compensation. Similarly, Desai 
and Goolsbee (2014) showed that the dividend tax cut, despite its high revenue cost, had minimal, if any, influence 
on investment incentives. 
Bonus depreciation, passed in the US in 2002 (it expired at the end of 2004) and again in 2008 allowed firms to 
deduct from their taxable income a “bonus” percentage of the cost of investment purchases. House and Shapiro (2008) 
explored the effect of the bonus depreciation allowance in 2002–03. Only investment goods with a tax recovery period 
up to 20 years qualified. The results suggest that bonus depreciation had a powerful effect on the composition of 
investment, in that there were steep increases in capital investment in assets that benefited substantially from the policy.  
Recently Zwick and Mahon (2017) found that bonus depreciation had a substantial effect on investment in 2001–
04 and 2008–10. Theirs was the most complete dataset yet applied to study US business investment incentives, and 
their results suggest that the investment response is larger for small, cash-poor firms—but only when the policy 
generates immediate rather than future cash flows. Ohrn (forthcoming) estimated the response of manufacturing to 
bonus depreciation and depreciation allowances in the US that adopted such policies and found that both policies have 
been effective in boosting investment. The policies also affected employment and total production, but only several 
years after adoption. In a companion study, Ohrn (2018) examined how firms responded to the domestic production 
activities deduction, which allows firms to deduct a percentage of domestic manufacturing income from their taxable 
income and found that corporate tax rate reductions motivated larger firms with more cash flow to invest more, but 
smaller, more financially constrained firms were more responsive to depreciation policies. Edgerton (2010) found that 
tax incentives like bonus depreciation have the least impact on investment exactly when they are most likely to be 
used—during economic downturns when cash flows are low.  
To our best knowledge, this paper is the first to ask whether the investment tax incentives that Latvia put in place 
in 2007–12 were effective. (Forthcoming papers by Guceri and Albinowski (2018) and Mosberger and Varga (2018) 
look at the effects of tax incentives in two other CEE countries, Poland and Hungary). 
1. Policy Context 
Since 2006, Latvia has used AD policy to stimulate firm investment. It allowed firms to use for tax purposes a 
larger asset depreciation value (ADV, or AD deduction, hereafter) than for balance sheet depreciation, so that firms 
were able to reduce taxable income by the difference between ADV and the balance sheet depreciation value (BDV).  
The AD policy has three main components: (1) the general AD scheme, (2) incentives to acquire new technological 
equipment, and (3) investment incentives in Specially Assisted Areas (SAAs). Closely related to AD (but not limited 
to it) are R&D incentives (effectively, the fourth component of the AD policy). 
The general AD scheme sets out five asset categories, and the baseline depreciation rates range from 5 to 20 percent. 
The effective rates are twice the baseline rates for most types of assets. For passenger cars, motorcycles, water and air 
means of transport, the multiplier is 1.5 rather than 2, and representation passenger cars are not eligible for AD at all.  
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Depreciation (and hence the AD policy) does not apply to land, works of art and antiques, jewellery and other fixed 
assets that are not subject to physical or economic depreciation, as well as to investment properties, organic assets, 
and long-term investments held for sale, which the taxpayer has chosen to value at their true value. 
The incentives for new technological equipment applied to new production equipment acquired or established by 
the taxpayer in a taxation period commencing in 2006 or later and used in economic activities. For such assets, the 
acquisition or creation value was multiplied by 1.5 before calculating the depreciation deduction (in 2007 the 
multiplier was 1.4 and in 2008 it was 1.3). On top of this, the general AD scheme with double depreciation rates 
applied.  
Investment incentives in SAAs applied to taxpayers established and operating in such areas (the least developed 
municipalities, listed in the Cabinet regulations amending the Regional Development Law). Before calculating the 
depreciation value of fixed assets used for economic activities in SAAs, eligible firms could multiply asset acquisition 
or creation value by a coefficient varying from 1.3 to 2.0 for different categories of assets. Taxpayers eligible for both 
the SAA incentives and the incentives to acquire new technological equipment could apply just one (at their own 
choice) to the same fixed asset.   
R&D incentives allowed taxpayers to write off 100% (after January 1, 2014 – 300%) of the costs of research and 
development related to their economic activity (other than costs for geological exploration) in the year when the costs 
are incurred.  
Between 2006 and 2017, the Latvian AD policy was a permanent feature of the tax code, unlike the US bonus 
depreciation (see, e.g., House and Shapiro, 2008; Zwick and Mahon, 2017) but similar to the UK first-year allowance 
(see, e.g., Maffini et al., 2016). Due to multipliers, the Latvian AD policy was much more generous than the US bonus 
depreciation. 
Due to space restriction, the analysis in this paper is largely limited to the general AD scheme and the incentives 
for new technological equipment. 
Apparently, firms found the AD policy attractive. As shown in Table 1, AD deductions accounted for 11–12% of 
Latvia’s GDP in most years reviewed, though during the crisis it was about 13%. The AD policy apparently reduced 
firm taxable income by 2.8% of GDP in 2008, 1.5–1.8% in 2009–11, and 2.4% in 2012–14. In 2009–14, more than 
90% of all firms with depreciating assets applied AD schemes for tax purposes (Table 1). Indeed, in most cases AD 
makes it possible to write off an asset faster for tax purposes than for balance sheet needs, thus reducing taxable 
income. 
Table 1 
Accelerated and Balance Sheet Depreciation Values, Latvian Firms, 2008–14 
Year 
Accelerated Depreciation 
Value (ADV) 
Balance Sheet  
Depreciation Value (BDV) ADV-BDV ADV Coverage (ADV>0) 
 
€ 
Mill.  
% of 
GDP 
# Firms 
with 
ADV>0 
€ 
Mill. 
% of 
GDP 
# Firms 
with 
BDV>0 % of GDP 
% of Firms 
with BDV > 0 
% of all 
Firms in 
CIT data 
2008 2691 11.1 50591 1999 8.2 57075 2.8 88.6 66.1 
2009 2446 13.0 52158 2109 11.2 55511 1.8 94.0 67.6 
2010 2303 12.8 51121 2030 11.3 54954 1.5 93.0 63.7 
2011 2286 11.3 49504 1953 9.6 53317 1.6 92.8 60.4 
2012 2491 11.4 48312 1960 9.0 51502 2.4 93.8 57.2 
2013 2662 11.7 49473 2108 9.3 52400 2.4 94.4 56.9 
2014 2684 11.4 49216 2120 9.0 51908 2.4 94.8 56.0 
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Source: MOF CIT data 
AD for new technological equipment accounted for only a small share (from 9% in 2009 to 14% in 2013) of the 
total AD value but for a very substantial share of the total reduction in corporate taxable income (Figure 1). 
 
Source: MOF CIT data 
Fig. 1. AD Value and Implied Reduction in Corporate Taxable Income by Category, Latvia, 2008–14 
The share of new equipment in the reduction in corporate taxable income was 40–50% in 2008, 2009, 2011, and 
2013; about 33% 2012 and 2014; and almost 100% in 2010 (Figure 1).  
As of 2018, Latvia has abandoned its AD policy because its tax reform introduced, among other changes, the 
Estonian model of a zero CIT rate on reinvested profit. Jacobs et al. (2017) provide a discussion of possible advantages 
and disadvantages of applying the Estonian model in Latvia. 
2. Data 
The main data source for this paper (hereafter: CIT data) is the (anonymized) annual panel of CIT declarations of 
all 128,459 Latvian firms that paid CIT in 2008–14. In addition to pre-tax profit and loss statements, the data include 
detailed information necessary for calculating taxable income, such as total depreciation values for accounting 
purposes and AD values for tax purposes. For total depreciation value, the data report separately the depreciation of 
new equipment, assets employed in SAAs, and patents. The data include 4-digit NACE codes, 6-digit municipality 
codes, and type of settlement. The panel is not balanced, but for 47,280 firms data are available for each of the 7 years 
studies, and at least 5 years of data are available for more than 50% of all firms. However, the CIT data do not contain 
our key variables of interest, investments and fixed capital. 
As an additional data source we use anonymized extracts from annual reports of all Latvian enterprises for 2007–
14, provided by Lursoft IT. For each firm and year, this dataset covers tangible fixed assets and intangibles at the end 
of the year, profit or loss before taxes, the 4-digit NACE code, registration year, legal form of the enterprise, turnover, 
number of persons employed, CIT paid for the given year, and a 4-digit municipality code. In merging the two datasets 
we used variables available in both (year, profit or loss, NACE, municipality, CIT paid). Doing so is complicated for 
several reasons, among them (1) the CIT declarations (extracted from the SRS data warehouse in 2016) include the 
most recent versions of profit data, which might differ from those in the annual reports. (2) Similarly, the NACE and 
the municipality codes for the same firm might differ.  
Our matching procedure works as follows:  
Step 1a. Match by year profit or loss before taxation, 4-digit NACE code, and 4-digit municipality code. Step 1b. 
For every pair of firms matched in Step 1a for a given year, compare profit or loss before tax for other years. If the 
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absolute difference does not exceed €10 in at least one other year, the two firms are fully matched. However, if a firm 
from CIT data can be matched in annual report data with more than one other firm (i.e., has multiple twins) it is not 
considered fully matched. 
Step 2a (for firms not fully matched): Match by year, profit or loss before taxation, 2-digit NACE code, and 4-
digit municipality code. Step 2b: Similar to Step 1b, but follows the Step 2a result. 
Step 3a (for firms not yet fully matched): Match by year, profit or loss before taxation and 4-digit NACE code. 
Step 3b: Similar to Step 1b, but follows the Step 3a result. 
Step 4a (for firms still not yet fully matched): Match by year, profit or loss before taxation and 2-digit NACE code. 
Step 4b: Similar to Step 1b, but responds to the Step 4a result. 
Step 5a (for any firms remaining unmatched): Match by year and profit or loss before taxation. Step 5b: Similar to 
Step 1b but responds to the Step 5a result. 
Steps 1–5 result in matching 67.5% of all enterprises in the CIT data. For the firms still unmatched, we implement 
a second and third round of the same five steps but this time allowing for a profit difference of up to €100 rather than 
€10. This allows matching of 1.5% of all firms, thus raising total matching rate to 69%. In the fourth round, we repeat 
the matching procedure using, in each step, the value of CIT paid in addition to the firm characteristics used in rounds 
1-3; adding this new matching variable results in finding single twins in many new cases. As the result, 88.5% of all 
CIT payers (and 93% of observations in the CIT database) for 2008–14 are matched. 
Descriptive statistics (omitted here) suggest that matched firms are representative of all firms. Indeed, distributions 
of the two sets by 2-digit NACE sectors, by region, and by type of settlement are very similar, as are also distributions 
by profit before taxes. However, matching CIT and annual report data is not our main purpose: what we need are data 
on tangible assets and derived investment data. Depending on the year, data on tangible assets are missing for 20% to 
33% of matched firms. Hence, the working sample (matched firms with non-missing data on tangible assets) covers 
about 55,000 firms in each of the study years, accounting for more than 90% of firms in the CIT dataset whose balance 
sheets declare some asset depreciation. This suggests that for the purposes of this paper, the working sample is 
representative.  
3. Econometric Methodology 
1. Panel data models 
To evaluate the effect of a firm’s past AD experience on its investment we estimate fixed-effects panel data models 
of the following type: 
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖Z_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  γ𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖      (1) 
Here, 𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a measure of investment by firm i in year t; 𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are time fixed effects; Z_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a measure of AD 
used by firm i in the previous year; 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  are time-varying effects of AD on investment; 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is a lagged vector of firm 
characteristics (including fixed assets, employment, turnover, profit, and firm age); 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖are unobserved firm fixed 
effects; and 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 are error terms. To simplify notation, we allow t in (1) to take all values including the one for the 
reference year, say, 1. 
In model (1), the AD variable can suffer from endogeneity caused by reverse causality (a firm planning to invest 
in t may want to make use of AD in t-1) or by time-varying unobserved factors affecting both investment and AD 
decisions. Our baseline models use investment and AD rates rather than just indicators of positive investment and 
positive AD value, which arguably makes the endogeneity risk less significant. However, to address the endogeneity 
problem we proceed as follows: 
1. Construct the treatment group T, firms whose investment behaviour is likely affected by the AD policy, and the 
control group C, firms probably not significantly affected by the policy (see details below).  
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2. Estimate (1) separately on T and C. 
3. Apply the difference-in-differences methodology by comparing the change in 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (vs. the base year) in the 
treatment group with the corresponding change in the control group. Technically, this is equivalent to estimating 
on the pooled (T and C) sample a fixed-effect model like (1) amended with the treatment group dummy (also 
denoted T) and its interactions with other variables:  
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖Z𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖T + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖T × Z_𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + γ𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 × 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖   (2) 
The coefficients of interest in (2) are 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖; these are equal to differences in 𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 from (1) estimated on treatment and 
control groups. As argued next, if the base year corresponds to the crisis period, significant and positive t in other 
periods will indicate that AD has a positive effect on firm investment. 
We then modify this version of regression discontinuity design (RDD) by replacing the variation across time with 
the variation (within treatment and control groups) across firm size (in terms of employment). After replacing time 
effects with size-specific effects, the model takes the form  
𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑌𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  +  𝛽𝛽𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖Z𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝜆𝜆𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖T + 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖T × Z𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖−1 + 𝛾𝛾𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋_𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝜇𝜇𝜇𝜇 × 𝑋𝑋𝑋𝑋_𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + + 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝜀𝜀𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖  (3) 
Here, s varies across size categories and X_ includes firm characteristics other than employment. If one can argue 
that in the base category the treatment effect is absent, significant and positive 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖will indicate that AD has a positive 
effect for firms in other categories.  
2. Treatment and control groups 
Our identification strategy follows the idea of Zwick and Mahon (2017) to use as the control group firms in 
industries where investment is mostly short-term, as AD only modestly alters their depreciation schedule. Technically, 
our analysis differs from that of Zwick and Mahon (2017), who assign industries to the treatment group (respectively, 
control) group if the industry average discounted value of one dollar of investment deductions without bonus 
depreciation is low (respectively, high). We use for the same purpose the industry average ratio DR of accelerated 
depreciation value to balance sheet depreciation value, and the industry average difference DD of the same quantities. 
Our treatment group features high values of DR and DD, and our control group has low values. Like Zwick and Mahon 
(2017), we use four-digit industries.  
When all types of AD are considered together, the treatment group includes firms belonging to the top 20% in 
terms of DR (i.e., having DR ≥ 1.275) and to the top 33% in terms of DD (i.e., having DD ≥ €3,000), which ensures 
that AD provides a non-negligible increase in tax deductions. On the other hand, the control group includes firms 
from industries with either DR < 1.05 or DD < €500 and hence the increase in tax deductions due to AD is small. See 
Table A2.1 for details. 
Our estimates of the AD effect on investment include firm fixed effects and control for a number of time-varying 
firm characteristics. Nevertheless, in the spirit of the D-i-D methodology, it is preferably that the control and the 
treatment groups be as similar as possible. Descriptive statistics (omitted to save space) show that distributions of 
treatment and control groups by firm size, turnover, investment rate, region and type of settlement are quite similar. 
Moreover, across the years, the average proportion of firms making an investment of at least €100 is about 50% in 
both groups, and average investment rate (with respect to beginning-of-the-year capital) is 24.3% in the treatment 
group and 27.9% in the control group. Note, however, that there are inevitable differences between treatment and 
control groups in terms of industry composition, because definitions of the groups refer to industry level indicators.  
Real estate activities account for more than half of the treatment group observations, while retail trade (incl. trade and 
repair of motor vehicles) account for one-third of the control group. Most other services are almost completely in the 
control group, although manufacturing, utilities, and construction firms are present in both groups. 
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As AD began before our sample period, we are not able to use its introduction as a natural experiment, in which 
case t = 1 in (1) would correspond to the pre-reform period. Instead, we argue that during the crisis in 2009–10 
investment rates were very low (see Figure A1) due to cash constraints and the uncertain prospects of the economy, 
and hence the effect of past AD experience on investment was absent or very small in both groups (see Figure 2 below 
for empirical evidence). Hence, we use the crisis period as a quasi-counterfactual. Post-crisis, investment activity in 
Latvia revived, but not to the pre-crisis level (Figure A1); firms are more often cash constrained and are more careful 
in making decisions to invest. We expect that in comparison with 2009, the increase of the effect of past AD experience 
on investment is much larger in the treatment than in the control group, so the post-crisis 𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 in model (2) are positive. 
Figure 2 below supports this hypothesis. A weakness in this approach is that we cannot convincingly test the parallel 
lines assumption because we only have two crisis years.  
Our second version of RDD refers to variation across firm size instead of across time. Small firms are more likely 
to be cash-constrained and to have uncertain prospects; hence, we expect that in the treatment group, the effect of past 
AD experience on investment increases as firm size (measured by employment) falls. By contrast, in the control group, 
because small firms do not see an immediate cash benefit from AD, they are likely to invest only sporadically if at all. 
For large firms in the control group investment is likely to be a part of their business model; plausibly, these 
investments are regular due to short asset lives, leading to reversed causality of the estimated AD effect, which is 
likely to increase with firm size (larger firms invest more regularly).  
4. Research results and discussion 
1. Key variables 
We define a firm’s investment rate in year t as  
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼_𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) = log�1 + (𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺)(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)� /(𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 − 1))  (4) 
where K(t) is the end-of-year value of fixed assets, and 
(𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓 𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺)(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) = 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) − 𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 − 1) + 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 (𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) 
 (5) 
Note that (4) is just the continuously compounded version of the usual investment rate. We have used two firm-
level measures of AD experience: the accelerated depreciation rate:  
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) = log (1 + 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟)/𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 − 1))    (6) 
and the reduction in taxable income caused by AD (also scaled by K(t–1)): 
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴_𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) = log (1 + (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟) − 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑉𝑉𝑉𝑉(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟))/𝐾𝐾𝐾𝐾(𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟 − 1))   (7) 
The rationale for using AD_gain is straightforward; use of the AD_rate is motivated by behavioural considerations: 
the tax declaration template refers to ADV as one of the items reducing taxable income, so managers or owners of 
small firms might see this (rather than AD_gain) as a measure of the tax benefit.  In models with Inv_rate as the 
dependent variable, estimated coefficients on lagged AD_rate or AD_gain can be interpreted as investment elasticities 
with respect to the previous year AD value or the corresponding reduction in taxable income.  
2. Total aggregate effects of accelerated depreciation 
Table A3.1 presents estimation results from specifications (1) and (2) which use the crisis period as a quasi-
counterfactual. Expectedly, in both treatment and control groups and for both AD value and tax gain, lagged AD 
variables have no effect on firm investment in 2009–10. In 2011–14, we find a positive and significant effect for the 
treatment group (Figure 2). In the control group, there is no effect of the past AD value; the past AD gain appears to 
be significant in 2012–14, but the effect is much weaker than in the treatment group. Both specifications produce a 
strongly significant positive D-i-D effect of AD in 2011–14 (Figure 2).  
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A. Effect of Lagged AD Value 
 
B. Effect of Lagged AD-caused Reduction in Taxable Income 
 
Source: authors` calculations using MOF CIT data 
Notes: Labels in the D-i-D series show t-values from fixed-effect model with interactions 
Fig. 2.  Estimated Effect of Past AD Experience on Firm Investment. Treatment and Control Groups, D-i-D: 
(T_year – T_2009) – (C_year – C_2009) 
As far as other factors are concerned, the investment rate tends to increase with firm size and turnover, other things 
equal. Lagged capital stock has a negative effect on investment. Not surprisingly, enterprises in the first two to three 
years after registration invest the most.  
Among profit-making enterprises, as might be expected, investment rises in track with the previous year’s profit—
but loss-making firms also tend to invest more the larger the previous year’s loss (the effect among loss-makers is 
much weaker than among profit-makers). It might be rational for firms with large losses to invest more than do those 
with small losses, but this might also relate to losses carried forward and coordination of investment plans with a tax-
optimization strategy. 
Figure 3 presents AD effect on investment derived from specification (3) with identification based on variation 
across firm size instead of variation across time.  
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Source: authors` calculations using MOF CIT data 
Notes: Labels in the D-i-D series show t-values from fixed-effect model with interactions 
Fig. 3. Estimated Effect of Past AD Experience on Firm Investment, by firm size. Treatment and Control 
Groups, D-i-D: (T_size – T_50+) – (C_size – C_50+) 
Using large (50+ worker) firms as the base category, we indeed find a positive and significant effect of lagged 
AD-caused reduction in taxable income on investment for smaller firms in the treatment group, except for firms with 
six to ten workers. This effect gets larger as firm size falls, suggesting that there is no reversed causality. In the control 
group, the estimated effect of AD-caused reduction in taxable income is positive and significant among firms with at 
least one worker. This effect grows with firm size, suggesting that reversed causality is at work (firms use AD because 
they invest regularly) in the control group. In both specifications, the D-i-D estimate of AD effect on investment rate 
is highly significant for firms with fewer than six workers. The effects of lagged AD value (not shown to save space) 
are similar but somewhat less significant. 
3. Disaggregated AD effects on firm investment rate and investment decisions, by program type 
Each of our main explanatory variables, AD_rate and AD_gain, can be decomposed into three components 
corresponding to AD of new equipment, AD in SAAs, and other types of AD.  To isolate the effect of the AD of new 
equipment, we narrow down the Treatment group used until now (T_tot) by imposing, in addition, the following 
conditions (as before, we use four-digit level industry): (i) the industry average accelerated depreciation value of new 
equipment ADV_new ≥ 1000 euro; (ii) the industry average ratio of the accelerated depreciation value to the balance 
sheet depreciation value of new equipment DR_new ≥ 2.00;  (iii) there are more than three observations with positive  
ADV_new in the industry.  
These conditions reduce the number of firms by nearly a half, from 10.6 thousand in T_tot to 6.2 thousand in 
T_new (Table A2.1). For firms in T_new, one can expect substantial tax savings from using the AD of new equipment. 
The restriction on the total Control group (C_tot) that the industry average difference DD = ADV − BDV ≤ 500 EUR 
applies of course also to DD_new and is sufficient to make non-negligible tax savings unlikely. To ensure sufficient 
common support with the Treatment group T_new, we require, in addition, the industry average share of firms using 
AD of new equipment in C_new to be at least 0.38% (the minimum in T_new).  This reduces the number of firms by 
one-third, from 30.9 thousand in C_tot to 20.5 thousand in C_new (Table A2.1). Descriptive statistics (omitted to save 
space) shows that T_new and C_new  do not differ much in terms of  distribution by firm size, turnover, investment 
rate, region and type of settlement. 
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Disaggregated by type of AD models (2) and (3) estimated on pooled T_new and C_new samples provide some 
(inconclusive) evidence of the effect of the past AD of new equipment on firm’s investment rate and investment 
decisions. In this paper (see Table A3.2), we present only results from model (3), with identification across size groups. 
AD of new equipment is found to have a significant (at 5%) effect both on next year investment rate and on probability 
to invest next year, but only for firms with six to ten workers; the effect on investment rate is also positive and close 
to being significant for firms with 11 to 49 workers.  
Conclusions 
1. This paper has studied the effect of generous accelerated depreciation (AD) policy on firm investment in Latvia 
in 2009–14. Lacking data for a natural experiment, we use difference-in-differences methodology with 
identification based on variation across time, with the crisis period serving as quasi-counterfactual, and by firm 
size, with large firms unlikely to be genuinely affected by the policy.  
2. We find a positive effect of the past use of the general AD scheme on firms’ investment rate. 
3. The AD effect on investment is stronger in industries with most of their investment in long-lasting assets and in 
enterprises with fewer than six employees.  
4. Regarding AD of new equipment, we find a significant effect both on next year investment rate and on probability 
to invest next year, but only for firms with six to ten workers.  
5. Our results indicate that AD policy has indeed stimulated investment in Latvia. However, the evidence for the 
effect is stronger for the general scheme than for new equipment, and this raises the question whether the AD 
scheme in Latvia was too general and/or too generous, resulting in over-investment in less productive firms or 
industries.   
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Annex 
1. The Economic Context: Firm Investment in the Baltic Countries and Poland 
        
A. Business Investment Rate, Percent.                    B. Investment per Person Employed, € thousands 
Sources: Calculation with Eurostat data. Legend: LV – Latvia, LT – Lithuania, EE – Estonia, PL – Poland 
Notes: Total business economy includes all NACE activities except sections A, K, O, P, Q, R, S94, S96, T, U.  
Fig. A1. Investment intensity in Total Business Economy. The Baltic countries and Poland, 2008-15 
    
Source: Eurostat data 
Notes: Every point corresponds to one annual observation for one of the four industry groups 
Fig. A2. Business Investment and Apparent Labour Productivity by Level of Technology in Manufacturing, 
Latvia and Poland, 2008–15 
 
2. Treatment and control groups 
Table A2.1  
Definitions of treatment and control groups in terms of 4-digit industry average accelerated depreciation 
value (ADV) and balance sheet depreciation value (BDV) 
  Accelerated depreciation category 
  Total New Equipment   
  Treatment Control Treatment Control 
ADV/BDV ≥ 1.275 < 1.05 ≥ 1.275 < 1.05 
ADV - BDV ≥ € 3000 < € 500 ≥ € 3000 < € 500 
ADV_new/BDV_new   ≥ 2.00  
ADV_new   ≥ € 1000  
N obs with ADV_new > 0   > 3  
% obs with ADV_new > 0    > 0.38% 
N firms / N obs 10649 / 59297 30872 / 158259 6245 / 36907 20544 / 106119 
Source: Firm CIT and annual report data 
Notes: Firm size refers to the previous year. N firms and N obs refer to the working sample  
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3. Estimation Results – Fixed Effects Panel Data Models 
Table A3.1 
Determinants of Firm Investment Rate with Total AD Effects, 2009–14 
Treatment Control D-i-D Treatment Control D-i-D
L.Log(Fixed assets) -0.5017*** -0.3738*** -0.5053*** -0.3843***  
0.0122 0.0054 0.0124 0.0057  
L.Log(Turnover) 0.0790*** 0.0767*** 0.0778*** 0.0754***  
0.0083 0.0043 0.0082 0.0043  
L.log(Profit) 0.0149*** 0.0108*** 0.0151*** 0.0105***  
(if Profit ≥ 1 EUR) 0.0037 0.0019 0.0036 0.0019  
L.log(|Loss)) 0.0125*** 0.0033* 0.0124*** 0.0034*  
(if |Loss|≥ 1 EUR) 0.0036 0.0019 0.0036 0.0019  
Firm age (vs. 2-3 yrs)
4-7 -0.0282 -0.0498*** -0.016 -0.0419***  
0.0207 0.0102 0.0205 0.0101  
8-10 -0.0677** -0.037** -0.0505* -0.0306*  
0.0293 0.016 0.0287 0.0159  
11-19 -0.0759** -0.0547*** -0.0482 -0.0485**  
0.0383 0.021 0.0375 0.0210  
20+ -0.0586 -0.0513* -0.033 -0.0488*  
0.0471 0.0264 0.0461 0.0263  
L.#employed (vs. 1-5)
0 0.0896*** 0.0398*** 0.0835*** 0.0411***
0.0234 0.014 0.0232 0.0139  
6-10 0.063*** 0.0679*** 0.0590*** 0.0690***  
0.0196 0.0104 0.0195 0.0103  
11-49 0.0916*** 0.0905*** 0.0949*** 0.0953***  
0.0282 0.0151 0.0281 0.0149  
50+ 0.1230*** 0.1106*** 0.1230*** 0.1179***  
0.0456 0.0277 0.0456 0.0276  
L.AD 0.0074 -0.0026 -0.0033 -0.0039
0.0350 0.0140 0.0323 0.0163
year#L.AD:     2010 -0.0369 -0.1109*** 0.0740 -0.0647 -0.0457** -0.019
0.0457 0.0213 0.0504 0.0457 0.0214 0.0505
2011 0.0697 -0.0725*** 0.1422*** 0.0917* -0.0088 0.1005*
0.0457 0.0202 0.0499 0.0474 0.0227 0.0525
2012 0.1494*** 0.0179 0.1315*** 0.1696*** 0.0503** 0.1192**
0.0453 0.0201 0.0496 0.0459 0.0218 0.0508
2013 0.1381*** 0.0184 0.1197** 0.1896*** 0.0782*** 0.1113**
0.044 0.0194 0.0481 0.0462 0.0225 0.0513
2014 0.1267*** 0.0024 0.1243** 0.1705*** 0.0684*** 0.1021*
0.0433 0.0222 0.0486 0.0462 0.0244 0.0522
Year fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Firm fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
R-sq: within 0.3252 0.2387 0.2678 0.3167 0.2402 0.2655
overall 0.0753 0.0479 0.0329 0.0679 0.0476 0.034
N obs/N firms, 1000 37.3 / 8.98 103.9 / 26.6 141.2 / 35.6 37.0 / 8.97 103.4 / 26.6 141.4 / 35.5
 AD = AD_rate, see (6)  AD = AD_gain, see (7)Dep. Var.: Inv_rate, 
see (4)-(5)
 
Source: Calculation with firm CIT and annual report data. Notes: AD refers to total accelerated depreciation variables 
Notes: Columns “Treatment” and “Control” present estimates of model (1) on groups defined in Table A2.1 (panel 
“Total”). Columns D-i-D present only time-varying coefficients t of interactions of the treatment dummy (T) with 
lagged AD_rate or AD_gain from model (2) estimated on the Treatment + Control sample. Robust standard errors 
(shown in italics) are clustered on firms. Legend:* p<.1; ** p<.05; *** p<.01 
 
 
.  
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Table A3.2  
AD of New Equipment: Effects on Firm Investment Rate and Probability of Investment 
T_new C_new D-i-D T_new C_new D-i-D
L.AD_new -0.0686 0.0256 0.0307 0.004
0.0894 0.1219 0.0495 0.071
N workers (vs. 50+)#L.AD_new
0 0.3184** 0.4146*** -0.0962 -0.0945 0.1772 -0.2717*
0.1452 0.155 0.2123 0.1069 0.1184 0.1594
1 to 5 0.0595 -0.0373 0.0968 -0.038 0.1036 -0.1416
0.1249 0.1362 0.1848 0.1075 0.0785 0.1331
6 to 10 0.7773*** 0.1444 0.6329** 0.4237*** 0.1017 0.3220**
0.2318 0.142 0.2717 0.1051 0.0976 0.1434
11 to 49 0.2347** -0.0454 0.2801 0.0293 0.0641 -0.0348
0.1019 0.1498 0.1811 0.0602 0.0895 0.1079
L.AD_terr 0.1454*** 0.1247 0.0537*** 0.1512
0.0412 0.1915 0.0188 0.1702
N workers (vs. 50+)#L.AD_terr
0 -1.6803 -0.3311 -1.3492 -1.250*** 0.1571 -1.407***
1.6234 0.262 1.6430 0.3144 0.3312 0.4565
1 to 5 -0.1306 0.0058 -0.1364 -0.0821** -0.1049 0.0228
0.0832 0.2045 0.2208 0.0403 0.1732 0.1778
6 to 10 0.051 0.0511 -0.0002 0.1013 -0.1721 0.2735
0.457 0.2005 0.4987 0.2117 0.1749 0.2745
11 to 49 -0.118 0.0221 -0.1401 0.0537 -0.1102 0.1639
0.283 0.2415 0.3719 0.0684 0.1784 0.1911
L.AD_oth 0.0377 0.1568*** 0.0704 0.0747**
0.1054 0.0602 0.045 0.0346
N workers (vs. 50+)#L.AD_oth
0 0.1028 -0.2376*** 0.3404** -0.0473 -0.0564 0.0090
0.1198 0.0711 0.1392 0.0523 0.0397 0.0656
1 to 5 0.0826 -0.1835*** 0.2661** -0.0332 -0.0442 0.0110
0.1065 0.0609 0.1226 0.0456 0.0349 0.0574
6 to 10 0.045 -0.1267** 0.1717 -0.0245 -0.032 0.0074
0.1235 0.0642 0.1391 0.0504 0.0363 0.0621
11 to 49 0.0056 -0.1424** 0.148 -0.0145 -0.0148 0.0003
0.1126 0.0642 0.1296 0.0502 0.0369 0.0623
Other controls
N obs/N firms, 1000 24.4 / 5.6 70.3 / 17.7 94.7 / 23.3 24.3 / 5.6 70.5 / 17.8 94.8 / 23.5
R-sq: within 0.3592 0.2416  0.2802 0.0396 0.0308 0.0329
overall 0.0915 0.0510 0.0582 0.0009 0.0062 0.0000
 AD = AD_rate, see (6)  AD = AD_gain, see (7)
As in Table A3.1
Dep. Var.: Inv_rate, see (4)-(5) Dep. Var.: 1 if investment ≥ 100 EUR
 
Source: Calculation with firm CIT and annual report data 
Notes: AD_new, AD_terr and AD_oth refer to AD of new equipment, AD in specially assisted areas and other types 
of AD, respectively.  
Columns “T_new” and “C_new” present estimates of fixed effect models Yis = st + βsZ_ADit-1 + γsXit-1 + ui + εit on 
groups defined in Table A.2.1 (panel “New equipment”). Columns D-i-D present only size-varying coefficientss 
of interactions of the treatment dummy (T) with lagged AD_rate or AD_gain from model (3) estimated on the pooled 
(T_new and C_new) sample. Robust standard errors (shown in italics) are clustered on firms.   
 
 
